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Abstract—Many operations in power grids, such as fault
detection and event location estimation, depend on precise timing
information. In this paper, a novel time stamp attack (TSA) is
proposed to attack the timing information in smart grid. Since
many applications in smart grid utilize synchronous measure-
ments and most of the measurement devices are equipped with
global positioning system (GPS) for precise timing, it is highly
probable to attack the measurement system by spoofing the GPS.
The effectiveness of TSA is demonstrated for three applications
of phasor measurement unit (PMU) in smart grid, namely
transmission line fault detection, voltage stability monitoring and
event locationing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart grid [6] has been considered as an emerging technol-
ogy profoundly changing the modern power grids. To maintain
the reliability of power systems, wide area monitoring systems
(WAMSs) [12] are exploited to obtain the real-time system
status, which is essential for the maintenance and control of
power systems. The security of WAMSs is one of the prime
issues in the smart grid technology, since the power grid will
make operation decisions depending on these measurements
from the WAMS. Errors of measurements will cause wrong
operations that may lead to serious damages such as instability
or even blackout.
Most studies on security issues in smart grid have been fo-
cused on how to protect the data integrity of the measurements.
Accordingly, the attack on the measurements is named the
false data injection attack (FIA) [8] [11]. Different from FIA,
which requires hacking into the computer system of power
grid, in this paper, we identify a potential type of attack to the
WAMS, coined Time Stamp Attack (TSA), which occurs in the
physical layer.
It is well known that the measurements in the WAMS need
to be time synchronized [4] [12], which is often achieved by
using the global positioning system (GPS). As illustrated in
Fig. 1, with a GPS signal receiver, monitoring measurement
recorders (MMRs) trigger their measurements by the GPS time
signal. After the measurements are recorded, the time values
are attached to the measurements, which is similar to posting a
stamp to the measurements (thus called time stamp). Through
the communication infrastructure, the measurements with time
stamps are conveyed to the control center, based on which
the control center can align the collected measurements for
analyzing the system state and then take future actions.
Fig. 1: Illustration of synchronized smart grid monitoring with
GPS spoofer
Although providing important information, the time stamps
are vulnerable to attacks, since they can be modified by
inducing a forged GPS signal [5]. Moreover, it is difficult
for a common civil GPS receiver to detect a spoofing GPS
signal. The attack can be implemented successfully with a
high probability, since the attacker even does not need to
hack into the monitoring system. Although there is some
data processing procedure to handle the measurements, most
current processing schemes only consider the measurement
data error caused by noise and apply a simple smoothing
filtering scheme. Consequently, TSA can easily bypass the data
processing procedure.
In this paper, the impact of TSA will be evaluated for
three applications of PMU, namely transmission line fault
detection/locationing, voltage stability monitoring and event
locationing. Simulation results will demonstrate that TSA can
effectively deteriorate the performance of these applications
and may even result in false operation of power system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II provides the GPS spoofing attack model from the aspect
of signal processing. Section III briefly introduces the back-
grounds for applications of PMUs including the transmission
line fault detection/locationing algorithm, the voltage moni-
toring algorithm and the event locationing. Simulations for
demonstrating the impacts of TSA are presented in Section
IV. Conclusions and future work are provided in Section V.
II. GPS SIGNAL AND ATTACK MODEL
In this section, we briefly introduce the GPS signal recep-
tion processing. Then we propose the attack model for GPS
spoofing and TSA.
A. GPS Signal Reception
The precise timing information from GPS signals includes
two parts. One is embedded in the navigation messages
demodulated from the received GPS signals, which has the
precision of a second; the other part is the precise signal
propagation time from the GPS satellite to the receiver, which
has the precision of a millisecond for civil users.
The system-wide synchronization time reference is referred
to the coordinated universal time (UTC) tUTC disseminated
by GPS, which is given by
tUTC = trcv − tp −∆tUTC , (1)
where trcv and tp represent the receiver clock time and
propagation time for the GPS signal, respectively, and ∆tUTC
denotes the time corrections provided by the GPS ground
controllers. To obtain the navigation message, we need to
demodulate the GPS signal.
The received standard positioning service (SPS) GPS signal
r(t) is given by
r(t) =
32∑
k=1
Hk(2Pc)
1
2 (Ck(t)⊕Dk(t))cos2pi(fL1+∆fk)t+n(t),
(2)
where Hk and Pc are the channel matrix for the k-th satellite
and the signal power, respectively, Ck(t) and Dk(t) are the
spread spectrum sequence (C/A code) and the navigation
message data from the k-th satellite, respectively, fL1 and
∆fk are the carrier frequency for civil GPS signal and doppler
frequency shift for the k-th satellite, respectively, and n(t)
denotes the noise. The received signal processing includes
two major steps, namely acquisition and tracking. ¿From (2),
we can observe that the key processing for acquisition is
to search for the code phase of the receive C/A code and
doppler frequency shift ∆fk. By multiplying the C/A code of
identical code phase with the carrier of the same frequency
as the received GPS signal, the navigation message can be
demodulated coherently [2].
B. Attack Model
To spoof a GPS receiver, the GPS receiver needs to be
misled to acquire the fake GPS signal instead of the true one.
The acquisition is implemented by searching for the highest
correlation peak in the code phase-carrier frequency two
dimensional space. Intuitively, the signal with a higher signal-
to-noise-ratio (SNR) will have a higher correlation peak, which
is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Therefore, there exists a two-step spoofing strategy. In the
first step, the spoofer launches a certain interference and
(a) No attack (b) Under spoofing attck
Fig. 2: Comparison of correlation peak under normal and
spoofing attack conditions.
causes the GPS receiver to lose track. Then, it sends spoofing
GPS signal when the GPS receiver carries out the acquisition
processing. Consequently, the GPS receiver will track the fake
GPS signal due to its higher correlation peak, since the fake
GPS signal has a higher SNR.
III. INTRODUCTION TO APPLICATIONS OF PMU
In this section, we provide a brief introduction to the
applications of PMUs requiring precise timing information,
which include the transmission line fault detection/locationing
algorithm, the voltage monitoring algorithm and the event
locationing.
A. Transmission Line Fault Detection and Locationing
An algorithm for transmission line fault detec-
tion/locationing can quickly detect the fault and estimate
the fault location. Many studies have suggested to utilize
the measurements at both ends of the transmission line to
improve the locationing accuracy [13]–[15]. Here, we briefly
review the fault detection and locationing method proposed
in [14] which utilizes the measurements at both ends and
thus requires time synchronization. As [14] focuses on long
transmission lines, we can extend it to short and medium
transmission line, which is omitted in this paper due to the
limited space.
Fig. 3: Model for long transmission line with fault
Fig. 3 shows the long transmission line model [18] with
fault [14]. In this model V ′R and V ′S are the voltages at the
receiving and sending ends with unit V ; I ′R and I ′S are the
currents at both ends of the line with unit A. Suppose that
the total length of transmission line is L miles or kilometers.
The length from the fault to the receiving end is DL miles or
kilometers, in which D is the fault location index. Z ′SF and
Z ′FR are the impedances of each transmission line segment.
Y ′SF and Y ′FR are the admittances of each transmission line
segment.
When a fault occurs, the voltage VF at the fault location
can be calculated from the measurements, V ′SF and I ′SF , at the
sending side, or measurements V ′FR and I ′FR, at the receiving
side. The computation results of VF from both sides should
be equal to each other. Based on this observation, the fault
locationing index can be estimated as [14]:
De =
ln(N/M)
2γL
, (3)
where
N =
VR − ZcIR
2
−
VS − ZcIS
2
exp(γL), (4)
M =
VS + ZcIS
2
exp(−γL)−
VR + ZcIR
2
, (5)
where Zc is called the characteristic impedance of the line
which is equal to Zc =
√
z1/y1. As N and M change
suddenly because of the fault and their post-fault values are
greatly larger than the pre-fault one, N and M can be used
as the fault indicators [14]. Note that the above computation
needs a perfect time synchronization of the measurements at
the two ends, which exposing the system to possible TSA.
B. Voltage Stability Monitoring
One commonly used method to evaluate the voltage stability
is to use the Thevenin Equivalent Circuit to simplify the model
[19]. The principle is to model the remote system as a voltage
source E¯th with impedance Z¯th, and the local load as an
impedance Z¯L. The maximum power can be obtained when
|Z¯th| = |Z¯L|.
Fig. 4: Transformed circuit for Power System
With the Thevenin Equivalent Circuit, two indices for
voltage stability margin can be obtained [19]. The first index
is associated with the load impedance:
MARGINZ = 100(1− kcrit), (6)
where
kcrit =
∣∣∣∣ Z¯thZ¯L
∣∣∣∣ . (7)
The second index is associated with active power delivered to
the load bus (in p.u.)
MARGINP =
{
pLmax − PL ifZ¯L > Z¯th
0 ifZ¯L > Z¯th
(8)
The indices can be used to evaluate the stability. More details
can be found in [19]. Note that the above parameters need to be
estimated from the synchronized measurements, thus making
the algorithm vulnerable to possible TSA.
C. Event Locationing
One of the essential monitoring tasks in smart grid is to
locate the disturbing event in power grid. When a significant
disturbance occurs, there will be many symptoms such as
voltage and frequency violations in both time and space. The
perturbation will travel throughout the grid [9]. Therefore,
the distributed monitoring devices will capture the variance
of the measurements and send these data to the monitoring
system server or exchange with their neighbors. The event
time and location can be deduced from the time stamp on these
measurements. After receiving the measurements from these
monitoring devices, servers need to decide the hypocenter of
the event, which is typically marked as the wave front arrival
time [1]. On aligning these measurements according to their
time stamps, the event arriving time at each monitoring device
can be attained. Consequently, the disturbing event location
can be deduced by triangulation, which is given by (consider
four MMRs)
(x1 − xe)
2 + (y1 − ye)
2 − V 2e (t1 − te)
2 = 0
(x2 − xe)
2 + (y2 − ye)
2 − V 2e (t2 − te)
2 = 0
(x3 − xe)
2 + (y3 − ye)
2 − V 2e (t3 − te)
2 = 0
(x4 − xe)
2 + (y4 − ye)
2 − V 2e (t4 − te)
2 = 0, (9)
when ti, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 is the disturbing event arrival time to
the i-th MMR, (xi, yi) and (xe, ye) are the coordinates of the
i-th MMR and the disturbing event location, respectively, and
Ve is the event propagation speed in the power grid network.
Since the coordinates and the arrival time of each MMR are
known, the Newton’s method can be applied to solve these
equations and attain the event location and time. Obviously, if
the timing is incorrect, a wrong event location will be deduced
from the incorrect equations.
IV. DAMAGE OF TIME STAMP ATTACK
In this section, simulations have been conducted to evaluate
the damage of TSA on the three applications of PMUs
introduced in the previous section. Since the main impact
of TSA on smart grids is the asynchronism of phase angle
measurements among PMUs, we focus on evaluating the
impact of the asynchronism on these applications. The phase
angle errors resulted from TSA at the sending PMU and
receiving PMU are denoted by ∆θS and ∆θR, respectively.
The phase angle asynchronisim between the sending PMU
and receiving PMU is denoted by ∆θ which is equal to
∆θR −∆θS .
A. TSA on Transmission Line Fault Detection and Locationing
The simulation model for transmission line is shown in
Fig. 5. The parameters for the transmission line are the same
as those in [13]. The lengths for long, medium and short
Fig. 5: Simulation model for transmission line fault locationing
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Fig. 6: Fault indicators, A and B, for short transmission line
transmission lines are 400 miles, 50 miles and 25 miles,
respectively. The total simulation time is 10s, and the fault
occurs at 5s.
1) Short Transmission Line: Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show the
fault indicators, A and B (the computational details will be
given in our journal version), and the performance of fault
locationing for short transmission line with different phase
angle asynchronism ∆θ. Fig. 6 demonstrates that the gaps
for fault indicators, A and B, decrease as |∆θ| increases.
For A, the gaps corresponding to |∆θ| = 0, 5, 25 are around
55, 45, and 20, respectively. In other words, if A is used as
the fault indicator, the performance of fault detection will be
deteriorated by TSA. As shown in Fig. 7, the fault locationing
error is very small even if ∆θ is as large as 30. Therefore, the
performance of fault locationing for short transmission lines
is only negligibly affected by TSA.
2) Medium Transmission Line: Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 depict
the fault indicators, B and C (the computational details will
be given in our journal version), and the performance of fault
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Fig. 7: Performance of fault locationing for short transmission
line
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Fig. 8: Fault indicators, B and C, for medium transmission
line
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Fig. 9: Performance of fault locationing for medium transmis-
sion line
locationing for medium transmission lines with different phase
angle asynchronism ∆θ. As shown in Fig. 8, prior to the fault
occurrence, the values of B and C (especially C) increase as
∆θ increases. When ∆θ is equal to 25, the value of C before
the fault occurrence is larger than C after fault occurrence
when there is no phase angle asynchronism. Therefore, the
false alarm probability would be increased under TSA. As
shown in Fig. 9, the fault locationing error is proportional to
∆θ. When fault location index D is equal to 0.5 or 0.75, the
fault locationing error is as large as 0.3 when ∆θ is equal to
30.
3) Long Transmission Line: Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 illustrate
the fault indicators, N and M , obtained from (4) and the
performance of fault locationing for long transmission lines
with Phase ABC fault and different phase angle asynchronism
∆θ. Under TSA, the gaps of fault indicators, N and M ,
decrease as ∆θ increases. As the values of the fault indicators,
N and M , are much more than the fault indicators for short
and medium transmission lines when fault occurs, the impact
of TSA does not have much impact on the fault detection
in long transmission lines. For long transmission lines, the
fault locationing error is also proportional to the phase angle
asynchronism ∆θ. When the fault location index D is equal to
0.5 or 0.75, the fault locationing error is as large as 0.2 when
∆θ is equal to 30. Fig. 12 compares the performance of fault
locationing with different types of faults under TSA. Fig. 12
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Fig. 10: Fault indicators: N and M, for long transmission lines
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Fig. 11: Performance of fault location for long transmission
lines
shows that, for type Phase A and type Phase AB faults, the
performance of fault locationing is worse than that of type
Phase ABC fault.
B. Voltage Stability Monitoring
The simulation model for the voltage stability monitoring is
shown in Fig. 13. The root mean square amplitude of source
voltage dynamically changes with frequency 1Hz. The load
has a constant power. There are three transmission lines. A
type phase ABC short-circuit fault occurs on transmission line
1 between 2s and 2.5s. Transmission lines 1 and 2 are tripped
at time 4s and 6s, respectively.
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Fig. 12: Performance of fault locationing for long transmis-
sions line
The simulation results are shown in Figures 14, 15 and 16,
respectively. As shown in Fig. 15, only the power margin index
MARGINP is affected by the phase angle asynchronism ∆θR
caused by TSA. Fig. 16 illustrates the normalized mean power
margin index which is defined as
E
[
| ̂MARGINP − MARGINP |
]
, (10)
where ̂MARGINP is the estimated power margin index. As
shown in Fig. 16, the estimated error increases as |∆θ|
increases. Another observation from the simulation result is
that the estimated error is not symmetric with the phase angle
asynchronism ∆θ. The increasing rate of estimated error for
a positive ∆θ is much larger than that for a negative ∆θ.
Fig. 13: Simulation model for voltage stability
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Fig. 14: Voltages and currents at the sending and receiving
ends
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Fig. 15: Voltage stability indices
C. Regional Disturbing Event Location
For the disturbing event location, the sampling is trigged by
the GPS time signal as illustrated in Fig. 1. A forged GPS time
signal can control the sampling in a wrong time or provide a
wrong time stamp for the measurements. The simulation on
the effect on the event location is shown in Fig. 17. It can be
observed that, with one MMR under TSA, the estimation of
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Fig. 16: Performance of voltage stability monitoring index 1
with different phase angle asynchronism
disturbing event will be far away from the true position (the
event happening in Mississippi is misled to Tennessee).
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Fig. 17: Simulation of TSA on disturbing event location
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we have identified the GPS spoofing based
TSA in power grids. The time stamps are modified by the
forged GPS signal, and the time stamp related measurements
will be corrupted by TSA. TSA in several scenarios have
been studied in this paper. For the transmission line fault
detection and locationing, TSA can not only deteriorate the
performance of fault locationing, but also increase the false
alarm probability with some fault indicators. For the voltage
stability monitoring, TSA can exaggerate the power margin
and result in delaying or disabling the voltage instability alarm.
It has also been demonstrated that the TSA can significantly
damage the event location in power grid.
In our future work, we will study the protection scheme
against TSA. From the viewpoint of signal processing, the fake
GPS signal cannot erase the true GPS signal as illustrated in
Fig. 2. To mislead the GPS signal tracking, the spoofer must
transmit a fake GPS signal with a higher SNR; thus we can
detect the TSA by the SNR of the correlation peak. Since the
spoofer’s fake GPS signal has a significant direction of arrival,
TSA may also be detected by applying the direction of arrival
(DOA) discrimination [7], which will be further studied in our
future work.
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